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Permanent Housing for Seasonal Workers? A
Generalized Peak Load Investment Model for
Farm Worker Housing
Elvis Qenani-Petrela, Ron Mittelhammer, and
Philip Wandschneider
Many seasonal workers are housed in transitory accommodations, including tents and
vehicles. In this study, we analyze the supply side of this problem by assuming that a public
agent must house the workers through direct public investment. A peak load model is
adapted to develop investment rules for the least-cost provision of seasonal worker housing,
adding an interacting multi-season component to existing models. Based on this model and
the data from three prototype projects, the majority of the least-cost investment would be in
permanent, but seasonally occupied, housing.
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Many industries rely on inputs that have large
swings in seasonal usage. For example,
agriculture, tourism, fishing, and logging all
depend on seasonal labor. Where input supply
is flexible, the industry can adapt to seasonal
variations in demand and input prices. How-
ever, a ‘‘peak load problem’’ can emerge if
certain rigidities exist. The peak load invest-
ment problem was first analyzed in energy
markets, where demand fluctuates significant-
ly. Since electrical energy is difficult to store
on a large scale, energy capacity must be built
to supply all levels of demand, including the
highest (peak load), instantaneously, or grave
consequences occur—brownouts and black-
outs. However, maintaining capacity to meet
peak loads leaves idle an excess supply
capacity at nonpeak times. Hence, underuti-
lized off-peak capacity is consistent with
efficiency—if it is the least-cost solution to
t h ep e a kl o a dp r o b l e m .T h ep e a kl o a d
investment problem concerns determining the
least cost mix of capacity types used to meet
market requirements, including how much of
the capacity requirement should be met by
‘‘base capacity’’—characterized by high in-
vestment cost and low operating cost—versus
‘‘on-demand’’ or emergency capacity—char-
acterized by low investment cost and high
operating cost.
The provision of housing for seasonal
labor is analytically similar to the energy case.
Ignoring the considerable social dimensions
for the moment, the problem of providing
housing for seasonal workers is, roughly
speaking, a peak load ‘‘storage problem.’’ As
with energy, seasonal labor has great variabil-
ity and supply must always balance demand;
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# 2008 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationworkers must live (sleep, be ‘‘stored’’) some-
where. Again, while total ‘‘housing capacity’’
must meet peak housing demand, housing
capacity may be idle or underutilized in the
off-season.
Seasonal labor in agriculture epitomizes
these issues in many parts of the United States.
Producers and state employment officials
continue to report that they are concerned
with whether there will be sufficient supplies
of seasonal workers to harvest and tend to the
agricultural crops (Thilmany and Miller;
Labor Market Information).
For instance, in Washington, the large
presence of the apple and cherry industries
contributes to a persistent and large seasonal
swing in labor demanded, both among and
within years. Demand for workers increased
as the Washington industry expanded through
the 1990s and peaked in 1998. Currently,
employment levels are stable to slightly lower,
though they remain above pre-1990 levels.
Data on the levels of hired workers from 1994
to 2005 are reported in Table 1.
While some farm workers are drawn from
local populations, most of the seasonal labor
supply in Washington is provided by a
continuing flow of migrant workers who have
no permanent local residence. In particular, a
large part of the field workforce is supplied by
undocumented international migrants, gener-
ally from central Mexico. In informal conver-
sations with the authors, employers and their
representatives indicated that provision of
housing has been a pertinent nonwage strategy
in helping growers meets their labor demands.
For instance, one large landholder in Wash-
ington maintained the infrastructure for what
was essentially a private seasonal ‘‘camp-
ground’’ for his core workers. Many of his
workers were international migrants who
returned to his farm every year. While such
farmer-supplied housing is a feature of the
overall seasonal labor market structure, it is
not a general practice, presumably because
most laborers work on several farms.
While the research presented here concen-
trates on the supply of housing for seasonal
labor, the problem of housing migrant work-
ers is linked to other current regional and
national issues. Legal and illegal immigration
is a prominent and persistent national issue.
The United States and its economic base was,
and continues to be, built on immigration—
free, indentured, and slave; legal and illegal;
European, African, and Latin American; and
so on. While immigrants help build the
economy, they also place demands on the
social and economic infrastructure, leading to
policy challenges. Current specific policy
issues include legal residency (amnesty) for
current illegal or undocumented immigrants;
guest worker programs for temporary work-
ers; education for immigrants and their
dependents; language and cultural assimila-
tion; participation in health, retirement, and
other social programs; and impact on nonim-
migrant job opportunities and wages.
Housing, then, is just one of many
interrelated issues that stem from the contin-
uous influx of an immigrant workforce,
including a seasonal workforce. Changes
affecting any one issue can have unexpected
and unintended impacts on others. For
instance, type and location of housing can
affect: availability and timing of work, access
to education and child care, access to social
services, and social and aesthetic aspects of
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Washington State Farm Workers, Off- and Peak-Season






Mean SD Mean SD
1994–1998 18,707.1 5,728.9 54,990.7 13,577.6
2000–2005 14,446.5 4,648.0 45,168.6 11,785.9
Source: Washington State Employment Security Department (WAESD).
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generates the demand for seasonal worker
housing could affect—and be affected by—
any of the three major themes found in current
policy discussions: increasing guest worker
programs, legalizing the residency status of
many currently undocumented immigrants,
and strengthening the enforcement of immi-
gration laws.
Even when one tries to restrict the discus-
sion to the housing issue, one finds a complex,
multidimensional problem. On the ‘‘demand’’
side, stakeholders include, but are not limited
to, workers and their dependents. For work-
ers, ‘‘standard’’ housing is very expensive
relative to wages. Moreover, the seasonal
workers labor pool includes several subgroups
ranging from local residents to international
migrant workers. In particular, the interna-
tional workers are more interested in saving a
high portion of wages for remittances home
than in making a long-term housing invest-
ment in the United States. Therefore, for
many, if not most, workers, housing is a day-
to-day decision problem rather than a durable
goods investment problem.
Employers are also stakeholders. Individu-
ally and collectively, workers’ housing is part
of the package that attracts and retains
workers. In particular, housing proximity
can affect worker availability. Another stake-
holder is the local community. Housing
location affects costs of providing education,
child care, and social services. Also, housing
for low-paid and temporary residents is often
associated with negative public health, aes-
thetic, transportation, and infrastructure spill-
overs. Finally, society as a whole may have
social preferences over the well-being of
workers, farmers, and associated industries,
and the local community residents. Hence, the
state may take a direct interest in housing
based on a variety of concerns, such as the
strength of the industry that employs the
workers, the health of the local workers, and
the social infrastructure of the region.
Generally in the United States, purchasing
housing is an individual responsibility within a
housing market that is mostly private (albeit
with many government activities). Indeed,
many seasonal agricultural workers partici-
pate in the local real estate market. However,
this self-provision sometimes spills over into
the use of old cars and legal and illegal
campgrounds or substandard apartments. As
previously noted, these alternatives may be
financially sensible for the workers, but they
are likely to generate negative externalities.
Another alternative is to view housing as
part of the employer’s compensation package.
Indeed, in the general economy employers
provide housing for many seasonal jobs and/
or remote work locations—for example, dude
ranches, forest workers, and oil production
sites. However, the nature of seasonal farm
work is such that often a laborer will work at
many locations and for many employers
during the season. Therefore, employers have
low incentives to provide housing for transi-
tory seasonal workers, especially for those
who might be working for competitors.
Given spillover effects on the local com-
munity and the impact on industry, perhaps it
is not surprising that the state becomes a third
participant in the seasonal worker housing
market. State participation can take the form
of subsidies to the local housing market (e.g.,
rooms at local apartment complexes) or of
more direct investment in state-sponsored
housing projects. State participation brings
public choice and political economy issues into
the overall question. In summary, the seasonal
worker housing market is a multi-segmented
economic sector characterized by mixed pub-
lic-private-employer ownership and decision-
making patterns.
Regarding the scope of the housing issue,
consider again the case of the state of
Washington. According to estimates from
the Department of Health in the state of
Washington, the annual total number of farm
workers is approximately 60,000. Of these,
more than 37,000 workers, or about 60% of
the total workforce, were found to lack regular
housing during the growing season (LMI,
2002). Furthermore, another 120,000 members
of workers’ households (seasonal workers and
their dependents) live in inadequate housing
(WSOCD). Other states in the West, the
Southeast, and even the Midwest face similar
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Southeast is often scarce and expensive.
A complete analysis of the housing market
for seasonal workers would require a model
that accounts for the endogeneity of labor and
housing markets, the diversity of housing
market segments, and all the ownership and
decision-making patterns previously noted. In
this paper, we make a number of simplifying
assumptions that allow us to focus on one
prominent feature of the market. We take the
stochastic need for housing capacity as a given
and analyze the peak load investment problem
to provide for this housing demand. One
concern is possible structural changes in this
market. For instance, there is a trend towards
the substitution of capital for labor. Other
changes could be caused by changes in
immigration policy. However, without infor-
mation about the potential impacts of these
changes, we can not directly examine them,
although we can do sensitivity analysis to
provide some perspective on the relative
stability of our results.
Collecting the observations to this point,
we note that: 1) migrant workers are tempo-
rary residents who can pay very little rent and
often live in substandard and unhealthy
housing; 2) migrant housing often creates
significant negative neighborhood spillovers;
and 3) growers individually and collectively
have an interest in providing housing to
recruit labor, but high costs and liabilities
are expensive relative to the individual private
returns for attracting short-term labor (LMI,
2002). Thus in Washington, the state is
actively involved in providing the major
increments to housing, often by financing
community projects. Similar policy discussions
and government actions can be seen in other
states, including Florida, California, and
Michigan (Goodno).
We focus on direct state provision. This
begs the question of whether the state should
provide housing directly or purchase housing
on the private market. However, including
state purchases from the private market would
introduce the local real estate market into the
system, change the nature of the problem, and
reach beyond the available data. Our analysis
is made possible by accessible data on
investments in housing made by the state of
Washington. We obtained data on three
sponsored housing projects that differ in terms
of the technology used, capital intensity, and
the housing permanence. The projects include
permanent (capital intensive) structures
(apartments); seasonal housing in converted
shipping containers; and emergency tent
camps.
In the remainder of this paper we imple-
ment an optimizing investment model to
analyze this housing demand problem. The
model accounts for the seasonal peak demand
for migrant housing with both annual varia-
tions and seasonal cycles. We apply the model
to the three housing options using cost data
from the three state projects (year-round,
seasonal, and emergency housing). As with
the general peak load problem, we assume that
all stochastic demand must be met by one of
the three alternatives and that these three
alternatives include all options. One option is
designated the emergency or default outcome.
Hence, the three alternatives exhaust the
feasible set or dominate any other options.
While this assumption is adopted for analytic
convenience, we note that it is justifiable on
social welfare grounds if the state does not
permit ‘‘substandard housing’’ but instead
requires that full social cost housing be
provided even in the emergency or default
case. Finally, we employ data for the entire
Washington seasonal farm labor population
for convenience, but we do not mean to imply
that the state sector should provide all
seasonal farm workers’ housing. Determina-
tion of the ‘‘right size’’ of the state housing
sector raises important normative and analytic
questions, but they are beyond the scope of
the current study.
Literature: Peak Load Pricing
and Investment
The peak load problem refers to the issue of
determining efficient investment and pricing in
markets characterized by economically ‘‘non-
storable’’ commodities whose demand varies
periodically. The essence of the peak load
154 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2008problem is that the installation of extra
capacity to meet peak demand would result
in costly underutilization during the off-peak
time (Crew, Fernando, and Kleindorfer). The
classic example of a peak load commodity is
electricity, where production must match
demand at all times over the course of a
variable planning period. Peak load theory
was developed to optimize the pricing system
and investment schemes in public utilities by
applying marginal cost principles. The early
literature focused on the demand side,
examining welfare-maximizing prices for a
simple deterministic peak load model (Boi-
teaux 1949; Steiner; Williamson). The optimal
price in the deterministic demand model is
the sum of two parts: the operational costs
plus an additional amount to ration demand
through the cycle. Subsequent work (Boi-
teaux 1951; Brown and Johnson) extended
the traditional demand model to a risky
environment, allowing for a stochastic de-
mand. While Brown and Johnson found
results comparable to the riskless model, the
inclusion of uncertainty in the model resulted
in lower optimal prices at all times and, in
general, higher optimal capacity compared to
deterministic models. Notably for our study,
Brown and Johnson extended the analysis by
incorporating the issue of capacity investment
level. They recommended that the optimal
investment level be selected in such a way
that the truncated expectation of the willing-
ness to pay of the marginal disappointed user
should be equal to the marginal capacity
cost.
Crew and Kleindorfer (1971, 1976, 1978)
expanded the analysis by examining simulta-
neously the effects of stochastic demand,
multiple-year planning, and diverse supply
technology, including multiple plant types of
differing cost characteristics, on the welfare
maximizing policy of public enterprises. Fur-
ther contributions to the literature encompass
the cases of storable products, supply side
uncertainties, and outage costs.
1 Recently,
models of peak load pricing and investment
have been applied to a broad set of issues in
fields such as telecommunications, transpor-
tation, advertising, concerts and games, and
storage facilities.
In this paper, we extend peak load invest-
ment theory to the case where there are multiple
seasonswithintheplanning cycle andwhere the
investment options include technologies that
vary in duration (single or multiple seasons) as
well as technologies that vary in capital
intensity. This extension to multiple time
periods complicates the method of finding the
optimal solution since the cost of occupancy in
off-peak periods will be conditional on the
housing built to meet peak period demand.
The aforementioned approach is a net
present value investment model. In recent
years, many investment studies have incor-
porated aspects of real options. Dixit and
Pindyck and others extended the analytics of
financial call options to the domain of real
investment problems. The real options model
or ‘‘new investment theory’’ emerged because
most previous business versions of net
present value investment modeling assumed
that projects were reversible and that invest-
ment could not be delayed. In truth, once
built, projects are often ‘‘sunk costs’’ that
cannot be reversed or are costly to reverse
(for example, machinery is highly special-
ized). The presence of nonreversibility in-
creases the cost of a bad investment. Also,
investment can often be delayed to allow the
investor to obtain more information about
potential costs and returns. In principle, a
proper investment analysis should take into
account such alternative timing and revers-
ibility cost issues. (While the real options
approach specifically and clearly addresses
these issues, Abel et al. note that a more
sophisticated NPV investment analysis would
include these features.)
Despite the general importance of uncer-
tainty regarding reversibility and investment
delay, we do not explicitly apply the real
options approach for a number of reasons.
These reasons include the lack of appropriate
data, problems with specifying the nature of
investment delays for an obligate good,
possible partial reversibility, and the fact that
1For an extended literature review, see Crew et al.
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private investment case. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the existence of demand
uncertainty increases the cost of investment
(the real option value) and hence lowers its
relative attractiveness. We comment further in
the conclusions using some of the results from
sensitivity analysis.
Theoretical Model of Peak Load Pricing
and Investment
It is assumed that the goal of state government
is the maximization of the expected value of
welfare. In the absence of market failure
conditions, a standard measure of economic
welfare considers the net social benefits to be
the sum of total revenue (TR) and (Marshal-
lian) consumer surplus (S) minus production
costs (PC).
ð1Þ W~TRzS{PC
Marginal conditions for a general social
welfare maximum can be found by taking
derivatives to find first order conditions,
which will give the standard results requiring
marginal social costs to equal marginal social
benefits. The operational model takes demand
as given (but stochastic) and assumes that
demand must be completely accommodated.
Social welfare is maximized by minimizing the
costs of satisfying the given demand. In the
remainder of this section we present a formal
model of the peak load investment model to
meet demand, and begin with a brief nontech-
nical overview of the model.
Demand is divided among n periods with
each period having an independent stochastic
demand. Costs are evaluated for m alternative
housing strategies that range from a high
capital cost–low operational cost alternative
to a low (zero) capital cost–high operational
cost scenario. Costs are assumed to be such
that the ranking of alternatives in terms of
increasing order of capital costs is inversely
related to their ranking in terms of operational
costs. (Any other alternatives would be
dominated in any case.) In the empirical
application of the model, three alternatives
are considered over two seasons.
Once capacity is created, the cost of
satisfying demand is minimized if the lowest
operational cost housing alternative is used
first, the next lowest second, and so on
(Equation [3]). Total costs are the sum of the
fixed capital costs and the varying operational
costs. To solve the investment problem, one
minimizes long run expected costs.
Formally, for a commodity that faces a
stochastic demand, the gross surplus (i.e., TR
+ S) is given by the integral under the inverse
demand curve up to the actual amount
supplied. Let x 5 (x1,...,xn) be the vector
of quantities demanded in period i 5 1 ,...,n,
and let p 5 (p1,...,pn) denote the corres-
ponding vector of prices. Demand in each
period i is assumed to be in the additive form,
and can be represented as (we are suppressing
notationally other factors that shift the
demand curve):
ð2Þ Di(pi,ui)~Xi( pi)zui,
where Xi(pi) is the mean continuously differ-
entiable demand in period i. It is assumed that
an inverse demand function, Pi exists; and ui is
the random disturbance term where E(ui) 5 0,
for all i. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
relevant planning cycle is divided into n
periods of equal length.
Technology is specified as consisting of m
types of suppliers, indexed by ‘ 5 1, 2, m.
Suppliers have constant marginal (unit) oper-
ating costs b‘ and marginal (unit) capacity
costs b‘. A key assumption is that marginal
operating costs b‘ and capacity costs b‘ are
inversely related and can be strictly ranked so
that technologies with the highest capacity
costs have the lowest operating costs, and so
forth:
ð3Þ b1wb2w:::wbm;0 vb1vb2v:::vbm
The optimal short-run (operating cost-
minimizing) output ql,i(xi, q) produced by
plant ‘ to meet a given market level of demand
xi in period i, given the preceding cost
156 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2008structure and installed capacities q,i st h e n
defined by:
ð4Þ
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where q 5 (q1,...,qm) represents the vector
of installed capacities of suppliers 1 through
m, and output of the first supplier is defined
by q1,i(xi, q) 5 min{xi, q1}. The long-run
(operating plus capacity) production costs
over an n time period planning horizon can










Let Si denote the total output from all plants
in period i. Then, for any given values of ui, pi,
and q, the actual output in any period i is
given by the minimum of real demand or total
installed capacity:




ql represents total capacity of the
industry.
Given that supply must always meet
demand, welfare maximization is achieved by
minimizing the expected value of the total
production costs expressed in Equation (5)
contingent on all the preceding assumptions.
In principle, if demand were to exceed
capacity, rationing costs generally occur,
requiring the ranking of customers according
to their willingness to pay. However, to reflect
the reality that all workers must reside at some
physical location when not working and given
a social value assumption that all workers
must have ‘‘adequate’’ housing, we treat the
demand for housing slots as a constraint that
must be met, albeit the constraint is stochastic.
In effect, the excess demand is subsumed under
the emergency housing alternative (though see
brief discussion in Conclusions). Therefore,
additional rationing costs are not considered.
Application of the Peak Load Model to
Housing Investment
We begin with the basic method developed by
Brennan and Lindner, but we extend their
procedure in two substantive ways: we divide
the planning cycle (usually one year) into a
multi-season planning cycle with n seasons,
and we add technology with intermediate
duration (seasonal versus permanent or year-
round housing). In principle, n could be any
number of equal-sized seasons, and the model
could also be extended to unequal season
lengths. The mathematics become increasingly
more tedious as time periods are added
because the costs of occupation in each period
depend on the capital investment made in the
most capacity-constrained period.
The demand for housing in a particular
area is derived from the total number of farm
workers. (The demand can be scaled up or
down, for example to include dependents or to
incorporateco-occupancyofhousinginshifts.)
All workers must be housed in some fashion,
butthenumber ofworkerspresentatanygiven
time is uncertain. In this application we divide
demand for housing into the off-season and
the high season (i.e., n 5 2). The off-season
runs from November through April. Housing
demand increases substantially during the
May–October season as a result of the need
for pruning, harvesting, and related activities.
Three types of housing are available. Year-
round housing has high fixed costs but low
operating costs that are incurred only for the
proportion of time it is in use. In the two-
season model, year-round housing (if built for
the high season) is still available for the off-
season, essentially for operating costs only. At
the other extreme, dedicated emergency hous-
ing (e.g., tents) has relatively trivial (we
assume zero) fixed costs, but it incurs very
high operating costs when it is occupied.
2 We
also include an intermediate technology.
2These costs include the setup of entire tent-based
communities, together with all of the attendant
services required, including such things as utilities,
bathing facilities, bathrooms, waste management
services, and the like.
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the two seasons or for both. Seasonal housing
refers to semi-permanent housing that can be
‘‘mothballed’’ for some part of the year. Generic
examples include summer ‘‘cabins by the lake’’
or mobile homes. In the data relating to our
study, seasonal housing comprises converted
commercial inter-modal shipping containers.
While seasonal housing is still subject to
annual fixed costs, the operating costs are
incurred only for the season when it is actually
in use. In our application seasonal housing might
be used for just one season or for the entire year.
In principle, the incremental cost could differ for
seasonal housing used for one season or for two
seasons. In our empirical results, the seasonal
housing is only used for one season.
Let bY and bS indicate the unit capital
construction costs for year-round (Y)a n d
seasonal (S) structures, respectively. Let bY,
bS, bE represent the unit operating costs for
year-round structures, seasonal structures, and
emergency (E) tents, respectively. Finally, let
CY,a n dCS indicate capacities for year-round
and seasonal housing. Capacities for dedicated
emergency housing are variable and are simply
equal to the amount of emergency housing
supplied. For simplicity, emergency tents are
assumed to be available in any quantity
required to house residual worker households
not accommodated by the other two housing
technologies. It is assumed that the condition
in Equation (3) holds, and in addition the total
unit costs are greater for seasonal housing
than for year-round structures as
ð7Þ bSzbSwbYzbY:
Crew and Kleindorfer (1978) point out
that, in the case of a stochastic demand, the
optimal short-run allocation of demand to
capacity is achieved by first using the struc-
tures with lowest operating costs. In this study,
this implies that year-round housing, once
built, should be operated first and followed by
an optimal combination of other structures.
The expected value of the total cost
function to be minimized for the case of a
multi-season (n season) demand and m 5 3
















Ex i{CY{CS xiwCYzCS j ½  :
The first parenthetical expression of Equa-
tion (8) represents the expected total costs of
operating year-round (type Y) housing for
both seasons as the sum of capital costs bYCY
and the expected utilization costs incurred
when year-round housing is occupied. Terms
in the second parenthetical expression of
Equation (8) represent the expected total cost
of operating seasonal housing (type S), again
as the sum of capital costs bSCS and the
expected utilization costs for seasonal housing,
the latter being driven by demand that exceeds
the carrying capacity of permanent housing,
which motivates the conditional expectation
used here. In this formulation, the term bSCS
is the annualized cost for seasonal housing
adjusted for any differences in capital costs
between single and multiple season operations.
As there are no capital costs for emergency
housing (type E), the last term indicates only
the expected operating costs of emergency
housing. It is driven by the amount of housing
needed that exceeds the sum of permanent and
seasonal housing capacity.
Taking the derivative of the total cost
function with respect to capacities CY, CS and
solving the first order conditions, the efficient









Wi CYzCS ðÞ ~bS= bE{bS ðÞ
3Derivation of the first order conditions is
available from the authors. For purposes of deriving
explicit rules of investment, a normal distribution is
assumed for the cumulative distribution of the
variable.
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function (CDF) of the number of farm
workers during period i. The implications for
investment choice based on the conditions
shown in Equations (9) and (10) are that the
state should invest in year-round housing as
long as the expected cost of using year-round
housing equals the expected cost of using
seasonal housing (the marginal expected cost
of investment in year-round housing does not
exceed the marginal expected benefit derived
from this investment). This is satisfied for the
level of investment in housing capacity of type
one, CY, that satisfies the condition in
Equation (9). Beyond level CY, investment
should proceed in seasonal housing up to the
point where the expected cost of investment is
just equal to the expected cost of supply failure
(housing type three—emergency housing).
This is achieved by investing in housing
capacity of type two (seasonal housing) at
level CS, which satisfies the condition in
Equation (10).
Data
Data for this study were collected from three
state funded projects. Data from the San
Isidoro Project located in Granger, WA
represents year-round housing. Twenty-six
housing units make up the project with a total
occupancy up to 180 persons. The Diocese of
Yakima Housing Services provided the data.
The Diocese developed and manages the
housing complex.
The Esperanza project is a community-
based project located in the area of Mattawa,
WA. It represents a seasonally occupied
housing project that is available to farm
workers for six months out of the year.
Migrant workers who are employed by local
growers use this complex. Esperanza has
40 units with a total of 240 beds. It is open
to both families and singles. Each unit consists
of a 40-foot cargo container transformed into
a 320-square foot housing unit. Grant County
Housing Authority provided capital construc-
tion costs and operating costs for the Esper-
anza project.
The Pangborn tent-camp located in We-
natchee provides temporary shelter to migrant
farm workers during the cherry harvest. The
basic concept was developed to house large
numbers of farm workers engaged in short-
term harvest activities. Usually, the camp is
operated for about three weeks on a site. The
camp is then torn down and moved to another
site to make the best use of camp resources.
The camp has 50 tents and its total occupancy
is 300 people per site. North Columbia
Community Action Council and the Office
of Community Development in Washington
provided the data.
Capital costs for the projects analyzed here
are annually recurring nonuse related (fixed)
costs. They include construction and land
costs. Operating costs are defined as use-
related (variable) costs and are borne only if
the housing unit is being used. Labor costs
(management, maintenance and administra-
tion wages and benefits) are the bulk expense
of the operating costs. Other items include
water, electricity, sewer and garbage, and
maintenance costs. Capital and operating
costs for the projects are given in Tables 2
and 3 and additional explanations on cost
calculations are reported in Appendix A.
Marginal capital and operating costs of the
two first projects are inversely related as
described in Appendix A, with year-round
housing as capital-intensive structures and
seasonally occupied units as more operational
cost-intensive. Capital costs for San Isidoro
and Esperanza were amortized to obtain a
constant annual cost that is equivalent to a
present value cost.
4 The interest rate used for
t h eb a s ec a s ei s5 %, with sensitivity analysis
reported for some variations. Note that, in the
theoretical model, the seasonal housing would
have different capital costs depending on
whether it was used for one or two seasons
in a year. We simplified the empirical calcu-
4The investment problem can be approached in
terms of either the present value of all costs over time
or as amortized annual costs. Although solutions to
investment problems will be affected by assumptions
about final values and reinvestment, we suppress these
issues as a diversion from the main topic.
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ation whether the seasonal housing was used
for one or two seasons.
5 The operating costs
for the Esperanza project were calculated
based on a six months-per-year period (one
season). It is assumed that operating costs are
constant and would double if the facility were
operated for two seasons. This allows com-
parison of marginal operating costs between
projects on an annual basis.
The tent camp is the emergency solution
for demand. It is the default or residual
solution—meeting all demand not met by the
two main alternatives. All costs are treated as
variable costs. The cost per person for the
emergency housing was calculated by sub-
tracting the cost of the reusable items from the
total costs and assuming full occupancy of the
camp. The tents have substantially higher
operating costs than the other two housing
options.
Estimates of the marginal costs of the three
types of housing are given in Table 3. Note
that the long-term costs for the more perma-
nent structures should include some deprecia-
tion and repair costs. We have included
estimates from the project operators to cover
ordinary repair costs, but the true long-term
cost is unknown. We note the obvious: while
the state may find tents to be the least cost
emergency housing, from the perspective of
the worker or the employer, lower cost
alternatives clearly exist (old cars, undevel-
oped campgrounds).
Investment Analysis and Results
The solution of marginal efficiency conditions
shown in Equations (9) and (10) indicate that
year-round housing is the most efficient
option and should be used to meet demand
84% of the time. Beyond that, investment in
seasonal housing should follow about 16% of
the time. Tent camps are an expensive
alternative and are used to satisfy only
extremes in demand—a tiny 0.01% of the
time. In effect, the solution comprises almost
wholly a combination of permanent and
seasonal housing and emergency housing is
used in only extraordinarily rare circumstanc-
es.
While the equations are solved mathemat-
ically, a figure can provide intuition about the
process. Based on the marginal efficiency
conditions shown in Equations (9) and (10),
we can construct a cost-based efficiency
Table 2. Construction and Operating Costs for Year-Round, Seasonal, and Emergency








San Isidoro (Y) 89,715.00 1,640.00 7 50
Esperanza (S) 27,279.00 2,114.00 6 25
Pangborn Camp (E) – 9,254.45 6 –
Table 3. Marginal Costs of Investment in Year-Round, Seasonal, and Emergency Housing in
Washington State
Housing Type
Marginal Capital Costs Marginal Operating Costs Total Marginal Cost
($/person/year) ($/person/year) ($/person/year)
Year-round 27.29 234.28 261.57
Seasonal 8.07 352.33 360.40
Emergency 0 1,542.00 1,542.00
5This simplification has no effect on our results
because seasonal housing is only used in one season in
all our solutions.
160 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2008frontier. Figure 1 depicts only the peak period
since the peak period defines capital construc-
tion. The second period is conditional on the
first period, so it cannot be drawn ex ante.
The horizontal axis of the diagram indi-
cates the expected marginal utilization of the
total housing capacity as the amount of
capacity built increases. The vertical axis
represents the expected total marginal costs







where n denotes the number of periods that
demand is divided into, and bj and bj indicate
the unit capital cost and period operating costs
for the j type of housing.
The three straight lines represent the sum
of the unit capital costs and the marginal
operating costs for each of the three alterna-
tives at given levels of predicted occupancy.
The intercept along the right vertical axis for
each alternative indicates costs for housing
that is built, but unoccupied (i.e., only capital
costs are incurred). The intercept on the far
left shows costs when the unit is 100%
occupied—incurring both annual unit capital
costs and full marginal operating costs. A
straight line connecting the two reflects the
operating costs, and its slope is the (constant)
marginal operating cost. The marginal unit
has operating costs proportional to its prob-
ability of occupancy. Thus, where the margin-
al unit is occupied 50% of the time, it incurs
half of the period’s operating costs.
The lower, jointed envelope of the three
lines is the efficiency frontier. The most
efficient (least cost) investment is found by
choosing the mix of investments consistent
with the level of occupancy that must be met.
Figure 1. Efficiency Frontier of the Optimal Combinations of Technology in Farm
Worker Housing
Note: Vertical axis 5 expected costs; horizontal axis 5 increasing capacity and decreasing
marginal utilization, left to right
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provide for occupancy 50%of the time, one would
build all permanent structures at a marginal per
worker cost shown by the lowest line.
From this diagram one can see that, where
demand is certain and the level of investment is
low,year-roundstructures arean efficientoption
( l e f ts i d eo fg r a p h )s i n c ee x p e c t e dc o s t sa r el o w e r
than the seasonal and emergency alternatives.
However, as the probability of housing utiliza-
tion falls, investment in seasonal structures
becomes cheaper. Note that the seasonal slope
decreases faster than the slope of the year-round
structures—(bS . bY). As the extreme right is
approached, the expected marginal utilization
becomes extremely low, and use of the tent
camps becomes the best alternative. The kinks
in the efficiency frontier are switchover points
where cost is equivalent for two technologies,
as described in the marginal utilization condi-
tions of Equations (9) and (10).
Marginal operation costs in the off-peak
period are conditional on the construction of
facilities built according to the pattern shown
in the peak period. Recall that permanent
facilities are built to accommodate 84% of the
peak period and seasonal (intermediate) ca-
pacity is built to accommodate most of the
remaining 16% of full peak load. This means
that in the primary solution, whatever perma-
nent housing is built in the peak season is
available to house workers during the off
season. For this solution, the probability of
needing the emergency housing in the off
season is essentially nil.
Optimal Levels of Investment and
Sensitivity Analysis
Optimal (least-cost) levels of investment for
the state of Washington were calculated based
on the historical distributions of the number
of farm workers for the years 2000–2005.
Marginal efficiency conditions were solved to
derive optimal investment capacity by type of
structure using the nonlinear equation solving
software in the SAS package. Calculated
minimum cost capacity levels are reported in
Table 4.
In order to meet demand at the state level,
results show that investment in year-round
permanent housing should be sufficient to
house 57 thousand people, which will house all
workers 84% of the time. This compares to a
mean demand for 45,000 in the high season.
Investment in seasonal housing is for around
18,000 ‘‘slots’’ or people.
To consider a more risky environment,
sensitivity to increase in variance can be
examined. Results are shown in Table 5.
In this table, optimal levels of investment in
year-round structures for the state are derived
assuming different levels of variability. In-
creasing variability expands uncertainty and
pushes out the tale of the distribution. As a
result, the total required housing level increas-
es. An increase in the coefficient of variation
from 0.3 to 0.6 induces an increase of about
23% in the least cost investment in year round
housing. As one would expect, it increases the
cost-efficient level of seasonal housing by a
much larger amount—doubling the amount of
seasonal housing and increasing the seasonal
housing as a proportion of permanent housing
from 30% to 60%.
Because we lack data on other housing
alternatives, we cannot be certain how repre-
sentative these project costs are. This suggests
exploring wider confidence intervals through
sensitivity analysis. Moreover, costs may
change over time due to changes in technology
and construction input prices. Data from
Table 4. Estimated Optimal Levels of Investment in Farm Worker Housing for State of
Washington by Number of Hired Farm Workers, 2000–2005
Regions
Coefficient of Variation








State 0.32; 0.26 56,753 17,905
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sensitive to cost assumptions—different opti-
mal levels of investment are obtained as cost
assumptions change.
Table 6 shows that an increase of 25% in
operating costs or a decrease in capital costs of
25% would favor an increase in the ratio of the
year-round structures of up to 87% to 88%
(cases 2 and 5). This change would be
accompanied by an increase of 3% to 4% in
total investment costs. The opposite outcome
would occur with a decrease in the operating
cost or an increase in the capital costs (3 and
4). In these cases a shift of the expected
marginal utilization towards the left of CDF
causes a decrease in the optimal levels of
investment. Similarly, a decrease of 50% in
tent costs will cause a substitution away from
the seasonal structures in favor of the tents but
will not affect use of permanent structures
(row 6). While the increase in tents is large
relative to the baseline number, the number of
tents is so few that the overall pattern hardly
changes.
Several scenarios may generate the need for
different overall levels of housing slots. For
instance, proportionate changes in the total
number of required housing slots per worker
will change the results for both cost and
investment configuration. The need to house
farm workers’ dependents would increase the
total required housing slots (and housing cost)
per worker, whereas sharing beds by farm
workers (‘‘hot beds’’) reduces the number of
slots required per worker (reduces costs).
Hence, if some workers have dependents
Table 5. The Effect of Uncertainty on the Level of Optimal Investment for Year-Rounda n d
Seasonal Housing for the State of Washington
Coefficient of Variation
a During Off










a The Coefficient of Variation (CV) is assumed equal for both the base and the season demand.
b Mean level for the base demand is 14,446 and mean level for high season is 45,168.
Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis of the Effect of Alternative Cost Assumptions on the Optimal




























Tent costs decrease 50% 56,753.7 (84):(14.99):(0.02) 0
13,980.2 221.92
Notes: Number of year-round and seasonal units, respectively. Ratio of units of year-round to seasonal to emergency units.
a Mean and CV are the historical levels for the state for 2000–2005 data.
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each worker goes up, the investment ratio
would change in favor of seasonal structures
and the cost of investment would increase by
up to 5%. Essentially the opposite results
emerge if workers occupied fewer slots per
worker by sharing beds.
6 The later result also
applies for reduced participation by the state
sector.
Effects of different discount rates on the
capital costs for year-round housing are given
in Table 7. Reducing the discount rate to 3%
(from 5%) has an effect similar to that of an
increase in the operating costs as illustrated by
the data in Table 7.
Reducing the interest rate also lowers the
capital costs of the structures and moves the
expected marginal utilization higher resulting
in an increase in the level of optimal invest-
ment in year-round structures. The opposite
impacts occur for a higher discount rate of
8%. This is expected since the increase in
interest rate raises the capital costs and vice
versa.
Discussion and Policy Implications
Based on our data and methods, results of this
study suggest that investment in year-round
housing should be used to meet most of the
demand for seasonal housing. The base
scenario implied permanent housing for about
84% of the (stochastic) demand and seasonal
housing for most of the rest. Investment in
emergency housing (tents) is inconsequential;
it would be used very rarely (about 0.01%)
amount of peak demand. These results are
fairly robust. Sensitivity analysis shows a
fairly stable pattern with relatively small
changes in the investment pattern induced by
relatively large changes in costs, variance, and
interest rates.
Results favoring permanent structures
seem counterintuitive. They raise the reason-
able question: why invest a substantial amount
of money in providing an apparently expen-
sive infrastructure for an almost invisible,
clearly impermanent, and socially marginal-
ized labor force? The short answer is simply
that it is the cheapest option given the
assumptions adopted here. More broadly, this
question stimulates the following discussion.
One driver of results is the explicit assump-
tion that housing is a necessity—a literal
necessity in that everyone must be ‘‘housed’’
somewhere. It follows that the supply of
‘‘housing’’ must equal demand. The seasonal
housing problem is analytically identical to a
peak load storage problem—full ‘‘storage
capacity’’ must satisfy a highly variable
demand.
The location and nature of the ‘‘storage’’
place is, however, much more complicated
than storing electricity, water, or grain. The
housing market is complex, partly because it
includes several stakeholders, each of which
may have a different vision of the ‘‘demand’’
for housing. Starting with the seasonal farm
workers, we assume they desire an inexpensive
and safe place to live. Location matters to












Level of Investment (%)
3 229 59,699 +5.19
Base case 5 0 56,753 0
8 49 40,742 26.73
a Mean and CV are the historical levels for the state for years 2000–2005.
6In some migrant worker situations, workers with
differences in ‘‘shifts’’ sleep at different times (hot
beds). Thus, six workers might be housed in a space
designed to accommodate four. This situation would
lower investment costs along the lines discussed
previously. In the Washington case, this scenario is
plausible for some workers in the processing sector but
unlikely for field workers.
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services, food, and entertainment. However,
most seasonal field workers are migrants who
hope to send large remittances home. More-
over, many are insecure because they are
undocumented. Therefore, workers will view
housing as a short-term consumption necessi-
ty, not an investment problem.
Farmers may care more about worker
housing than many employers because hous-
ing can be a part of the compensation package
that attracts workers. In industries employing
workers located far from their employees’
homes (e.g., destination tourism/recreation
and mineral exploitation), employers some-
times provide housing as part of the job
contract. Often such industries have isolated
sites owned by a single entity. Since farming is
more atomistic, one must look at individual
farmer incentives. While farmers may be
collectively interested in providing housing,
individual incentives work against providing
housing because most seasonal laborers work
on more than one farm. The housing provided
by Farmer A could be a favorable externality
for the neighboring farmers. Indeed, informal
remarks by farmers to the researchers indicat-
ed that they only provide housing to their core
employees.
Local communities have an interest in
seasonal labor housing since migrants often
comprise a big population influx in relatively
rural areas. Local communities will want to
minimize negative externalities created by low
income housing. They will also want to
efficiently use their local community infra-
structure (education, health services) for the
services that will be used by these workers.
The key point is that, while each stake-
holder would like to ‘‘store’’ migrants, their
detailed motivations are nuanced. Each stake-
holder has a different demand and a different
definition of costs for housing the same
worker. Given the multiple demands, it is
almost inevitable that there will be public
interest in seasonal farm worker housing. The
state has an interest that represents stakehold-
ers individually and collectively. State involve-
ment raises both normative/ethical welfare
economics issues and an applied public
choice/political economy issues (see discussion
that follows). One can presume that the state
has a relatively high demand for ‘‘quality’’
housing, where quality refers to safety and
resident well-being. We can presume that
higher quality is more expensive than lower
quality. Hence we believe that housing pro-
vided by other stakeholders would differ
significantly in quality and cost from the case
we examine.
In summary, our results are based on three
conditions: 1) the primary perspective taken is
that of the state, 2) the state demands
relatively high quality housing, and 3) the
housing accounting identity requires the hous-
ing of all workers. Given these conditions, a
solution emphasizing permanent housing is
less surprising.
While our study is a simplification of the
actual housing market and specifically ignores
the contributions of the other sectors, the
current approach and results have provided
some of the groundwork for a more complete
analysis. Specifically, our approach could be
used to model the least cost investment
strategy for a representative agent for each
stakeholder. In addition to more data, addi-
tional work would be needed to develop a
normative and/or predictive model for each
agent’s preference function (individualistic or
collective) and to estimate the interactions in a
real world case.
Beyond the implicit restrictions, there are a
number of cautions against generalizing the
results of this study. First, we note that our
study is based on the specific financial data
from just three public housing projects and we
do not have information to know how robust
these cost data are. Another matter is that
housing is geographically fixed. Housing
markets are tied ultimately to locations, and
we have not modeled these spatial dimensions.
Thus, the mobility of tents may make them a
better choice when geography is included.
A major potential qualification to our
results concerns the timing of investment. As
we noted earlier, much current investment
literature uses the real options (or new
investment approach) to address the issue of
efficient investment timing under uncertainty.
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insufficient data, and more directly from lack
of a sufficient framework for this specific
investment problem. The real options litera-
ture is focused mainly on the timing of
investment and disinvestment. Where demand
is given, the alternatives are to invest to meet
demand, or failing to do so, to retreat to the
default. In our case, the default was emergency
tents. So, in one respect, our specification
already contains a real options approach—
where the cost of failing to invest is use of the
emergency tents. The study indicates that
failure to invest immediately and to rely on
the default emergency tents is prima fascia
inefficient from the public point of view.
Sensitivity analysis showed that the invest-
ment pattern would hold for large variations
in costs of emergency/default housing.
While we were able to directly incorporate
demand uncertainty for the public sector, we
did not have good information for uncertainty
regarding the structure of the labor market.
Clearly, the current market structure is subject
to uncertain changes from at least two
directions—technology and policy. This struc-
tural uncertainty means that, in principle, a
real options approach is warranted. The
possibility of investment delay and the irre-
versibilityofassetdisposal(asunkcost)should
be taken into account. However, technological
and policy uncertainty would be problematic
to model because the probabilities are simply
unknown. Our sensitivity analysis does show
that, as one increases the variance, more
seasonal and fewer permanent structures
should be built. Hence, the sensitivity results
suggest that one may wish to bend the results
towards fewer permanent structures in recog-
nition of general uncertainty.
While deeper modeling of the policy–
technology labor market future is beyond the
scope of the present paper, some simple results
can be found by hypothesizing likely scenar-
ios. The general direction of technological
change in agriculture is towards substitution
of capital for labor, so analysis of different
labor demand scenarios would be useful. Our
model results can be used to predict the need
for housing under different scenarios by
proportionate increases in the mean number
of required ‘‘slots.’’ That is, total investment
would be increased or decreased but the
configuration of housing (permanent, season-
al, emergency) would remain as calculated
here—if there are no changes in the probabil-
ity structure of demand.
Turning to policy uncertainty, one can
distinguish at least four new policy scenarios:
1) enhanced guest worker programs, 2) legal
residency programs for currently undocument-
ed workers residents, sometimes labeled ‘‘am-
nesty programs,’’ 3) increased restriction on
illegal immigration or 4) no change in policy.
Recent congressional debates focused on a
package including all three of the policy
change alternatives. In the end, the status
quo prevailed. No major legislation has been
passed at the time of this writing, but some
combination of these measures may be enact-
ed in the future.
Impacts of policy changes on housing
demand and, hence, investment requirements
are speculative. Enlarging the currently limited
guest worker program would institutionalize
and legitimize many currently undocumented
seasonal workers. One imagines that this
might increase the expected wages and stabil-
ity of the guest workers. Guest workers tend
to be paid more than illegal workers, so we
expect the net effect to be higher wages for a
more stable labor supply. Guest worker
programs also clarify the time interval re-
quired for housing. For the farm worker
element of housing demand, the key question
would be how much of their income workers
would spend on housing investments in
Washington versus remittances.
A residency or amnesty program would
likely have little effect on the need to house
seasonal farm field workers. Farm field work
tends to occupy the bottom rung on the
employment ladder. Workers who could
acquire legal residency would be unlikely to
stay in field work but would move ‘‘up the
ladder’’ to construction, for example. It is
likely that field worker slots would be filled by
new immigrants (legal or illegal) just as now.
While speculative, this appears to be what
occurred during the last episode of ‘‘amnesty.’’
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effect of making seasonal labor more expensive
by increasing the risk to illegal immigrants and
(depending on the law and its implementation)
to employers. One possible consequence is a
reduction in numbers of illegal seasonal mi-
grantsreplacedbyeitherlegalresidentsorguest
workers, presumably at higher wages. (See
previous discussion of guest workers.) If
increasedwages attract legal workers to replace
a reduced supply of illegal seasonal workers,
the impact on housing depends on whether the
replacementworkersare internal U.S.migrants
(California, Texas) or local laborers. To the
extent workers are from the local labor force,
housing needs will logically decline. If U.S.
migrants supply the markets, the housing
problem will be mostly unchanged.
Finally, suppose that more permanent
housing is indeed efficient. Then, one may
ask why there isn’t more state provision of
housing for seasonal agricultural workers? At
least three reasons surface. First, while we did
not use a real options model, a general rule
that emerges from real options models is that
more uncertainty often increases the cost and
postpones the implementation of investment
plans. Given the policy and technology uncer-
tainties above, perhaps state agencies are
waiting for more information to emerge
regarding the need for housing before they
commit their funds. Interestingly, our analysis
suggests thatthestatesector iscurrently‘‘over-
investing’’ in tent housing since our model
suggests thatalmostanynonzeroinvestmentin
tents is ‘‘too’’ much. Perhaps state-supported
tent camps reflect the uncertain investment
and political climate for state investment.
A second reason why states may not be
investing in permanent housing is that they
have more accurate and conflicting investment
data. Thus, the results would mover towards
seasonal or temporary housing if the relative
prices of permanent and seasonal housing are
higher than our data show or the private and
social costs of temporary housing were rela-
tively lower than our data.
A third and final explanation for the
relatively low level of public investment in
migrant housing concerns the political econo-
my of state governments with limited budgets.
Allocation of funds from limited state budgets
weighs investment by social values that
transcend the goal of efficiency alone. Hous-
ing for seasonal farm workers may simply not
be ranked highly enough relative to a scarce
budget and the consideration of more inclu-
sive social criteria.
[Received November 2006; Accepted September 2007.]
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Appendix A
COST CALCULATIONS
To allow comparisons of the data between the three
projects, calculations are reported on an annual
basis. Marginal costs are assumed to be constant.
ESPERANZA PROJECT (SEASONAL)
The Esperanza project operates six months out of
the year. It has 40 units and each unit houses six
people (total 240). The life expectancy of the
structure is 25 years. Capital construction costs
reported by the Housing Authority are $27,279,
and operating costs (per season) per unit are
$1,057.
MARGINAL CAPITAL COSTS (MCC)
Capital costs were amortized to obtain a constant
annual cost that is equivalent to a present value
cost. An amortization factor was calculated for the
Esperanza project:
AF~ 1{ 1zr ðÞ








where r denotes the relevant interest rate and t
indicates the lifespan of the structures.












MARGINAL OPERATING COSTS (MOC)
If the structure is operated for two consecutive
seasons, the annual operating costs per unit are
MOC=Unit=Year~$1,057   2~$2,114:
And on a per worker basis:
MOC=Worker=Year~$2,114=6~$352:33:
SAN ISIDORO PROJECT (PERMANENT)
The San Isidoro project includes 26 units with a life
expectancy of 50 years. Total number of occupants
is 180 with an average number of seven people per
unit. Reported capital construction costs equal
$89,715 and operating costs per unit are $2,343.
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MARGINAL OPERATING COSTS (MOC)
Assuming 70% occupancy during the year
(an assumption backed up by real operational
data), the annual operating costs per unit are
MOC=Unit=Year~$2,343   0:7~$1,640:




There are no capital construction costs for tents. The
only costs that are borne are the operating costs that
include the cost of predevelopment and development
of the site, plus the use-related costs. These total
operating costs for a year (or operating costs for two
sites) are calculated at $925,445. There are 50 tents
operated during one season with a maximum
capacity of 300 people. So, during two seasons, the
maximum number of people housed in the camps is
600 and the operating costs per worker are
MOC=Worker=Year~$925,445=300~$1,542:
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